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28 December 1956

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
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State Dept. review completed

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1. EAST GERMAN REGIME BEGINS ARRESTING WRITERS AND INTELLECTUALS

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East German party propaganda chief Kurt Hager, in an attempt to justify recent arrests of intellectuals and writers, has charged them with having made a hypocritical avowal of faith to the German Democratic Republic and socialism and at the same time using the "method of destructive criticism." Hager accused them of having contacts with the Hungarian intellectuals and of using them and "certain Polish intellectuals" as models.

Comment

The recent arrests of intellectuals, reflecting the tough line now in effect, though intended to serve as a warning to dissident elements among the intelligentsia, may in fact have stimulated opposition to the party's policies. Intellectuals and writers in East Berlin during the past few days have been expressing their opposition to these arrests, [redacted]

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The references in the party press to contacts of East German intellectuals with Hungarian and Polish intellectuals re-emphasize the regime's determination to eliminate ideological heresies in East Germany. East German Communist leaders have consistently blamed the anti-Soviet developments in Hungary and Poland on excesses and misguided actions by writers and intellectuals. [redacted]

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**2. PEIPING REPORTEDLY WARNS MOSCOW AGAINST
INTERVENTION IN POLAND**

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Polish foreign minister Rapacki claims to be receiving continual evidences of Chinese Communist support for Poland.

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Peiping had warned Moscow that intervention in Poland might split the bloc, with the Chinese themselves leading such a split.

The foreign minister added that the Poles have been in touch with the Chinese from the beginning of the crisis. Most of Poland's information on the thinking of high Soviet officials comes from the Chinese, according to Deputy Foreign Minister Winiewicz.

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Comment

During his tour of southern Asia Chou has been embarrassed by the necessity of supporting harsh Russian measures in Hungary and will probably urge the Soviets during his visit to Moscow in January to avoid similar developments in Poland which might threaten the success of Peiping's "peaceful" efforts in Asia.

Chinese Communist press and radio comments reflect strong sympathy for the Gomulka government and for Polish aspirations to a greater measure of independence. The allegation that Peiping would carry its support of Gomulka to the extent of leading a split, however, is contradicted by China's repeated insistence that bloc unity is the overriding consideration in relations between Communist countries.

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3. SITUATION IN INDONESIA

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Developments in Sumatra have taken a new turn in the reported arrest of Col. Simbolon by the new army territorial commander, Lt. Col. Ginting, who was appointed by President Sukarno after the coup. In a radio announcement on 27 December, Ginting stated that he had seized control of north Sumatra and that normal relations with the central government had been restored.

Ginting apparently commands little loyalty among local troops and police. His assumption of control raises the possibility of clashes between his forces and the supporters of Simbolon. Ginting is believed to be supported by the local Communists, [redacted]

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
Meanwhile, army and political sentiment increasingly favors a presidential cabinet, led by former vice president Hatta, to which members would be appointed irrespective of party affiliation and which would not be responsible to parliament. Hatta himself has stated that the Ali government must resign and that Sukarno should assume responsibility for setting up a presidential cabinet. He stressed the need for early action before groups in Sumatra "take too much power and revenue" and in order to avert revolts in other areas. [redacted]

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4. TITO WRITES LETTER TO SOVIET LEADERS ON HUNGARY

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President Tito told Ambassador Riddleberger on 23 December that he has written a long letter to the Soviet leaders on Hungary. He said he was hopeful of Soviet concessions that would meet Hungarian popular demands. He could not be sure of the results of the discussion "now under way," but thought he would be able to influence Soviet decisions. He again recommended that the West reduce its pressure on the USSR regarding Hungary so that Moscow could find some political compromise which he believes will eventually have to come.

Comment

Tito first referred to these negotiations on 5 December, when he implied to the Western ambassadors that there was more going on in his relations with the Kremlin than the West was aware of. Subsequently, Belgrade has offered no hint regarding their content.

The basis for negotiation between Yugoslavia and the USSR lies in their common objective of maintaining a Communist state in Hungary. While Yugoslavia would be unlikely to press for a complete withdrawal of Soviet troops now, it would probably attempt to gain Soviet concurrence in the restoration of Nagy to a top position in the Hungarian regime and a revival of politically active workers' councils. The USSR is unlikely at this time to accept such proposals but it could make a number of token gestures, such as a restoration of some Nagy followers in an attempt to gain Yugoslav support for its Hungarian policies.

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5. NURI SAID SAYS SITUATION CALMER IN IRAQ

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[Redacted]

Iraqi prime minister Nuri Said told an American embassy official on 24 December that the local situation is becoming calmer and more stabilized. Nuri planned to order the opening of all schools and colleges in Iraq on 29 December and to have parliament reassemble as scheduled on 1 January.

Comment

The abatement of the rioting caused by Syrian and Egyptian propaganda against the Iraqi government may be temporary. The trial in Damascus of allegedly pro-Iraqi conspirators is likely to bring new demonstrations against Nuri as a pro-British betrayer of the Arab cause.

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